Digital Infrastructures under Geopolitical Pressure: The Case of Autistici/Inventati

Camille Françoise 4 min read
On 26 August 2026, the US government classified the non‑profit collective Autistici/Inventati as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”. This decision led to the closure of all the collective’s services, precipitated by the suspension of its domain name by its registry and the intervention of its bank. All these actions took place without the involvement of a US judge, or of any European judges, and without any finding of illegal activity in the European Union (EU).

Autistici/Inventati: an Italian collective with a global community

Autistici/Inventati is an Italian collective that emerged in the late 1990s around shared interests in technology and computing skills. The collective built its first server in March 2001 and provided information technology services to independent journalists, Indymedia, union workers, and other activist communities. By early 2026, it hosted thousands of websites, mailboxes, mailing lists, and blogs for diverse communities, offering them security and privacy in a context of increasing authoritarian pressures.

The impact of this case is that Autistici/Inventati was forced, in early September 2026, to shut down its services, affecting thousands of users who relied on its mailboxes and websites.

A geopolitical power influencing infrastructural stakeholders

The US government classified this collective as “terrorist” without any judicial proceedings in the US or in the EU. Autistici/Inventati is based in Italy and is legally subject to Italian national and regional jurisdictions (EU). Following the US government’s OFAC designation, the top‑level domain operator Public Interest Registry (PIR) was compelled to remove Autistici/Inventati’s domain from the Domain Name System (DNS).

Additionally, other US‑linked financial organisations were involved in this case. Influenced by the US government’s actions and legally obliged to act accordingly, similarly to PIR, PayPal suspended Autistici/Inventati’s account. Banca Etica, an Italian financial entity, also suspended the collective’s account, although no Italian or European courts were involved in this process. This reveals, once again, the critical role of the US executive branch over critical internet infrastructures, and how global payment systems enable the extraterritorial enforcement of US objectives. 

The materiality of internet infrastructure

The Public Interest Registry (PIR) is a non‑profit organisation created by the Internet Society to manage the .org domain. It is based in Reston, Virginia, United States. Due to its location, it is subject to US jurisdiction. The fact that organisations operating digital infrastructure are not governed by multilateralism (multiple countries) nor by robust multistakeholderism (diverse groups and parties) gives the US a clear advantage when it comes to enforcing or coercing its influence worldwide. This affects and restrains the ability of stakeholders such as PIR to act independently and in a neutral manner with regard to internet infrastructure.

At the international level, similar systems have been put in place. EURid is the organisation managing the .eu domain and is based in Belgium. The Association Française pour le Nommage Internet en Coopération (AFNIC) manages the .fr domain and is based in France. However, the influence of .org, .com, and even .eu extends beyond the legislation of their country of establishment and affects users and organisations worldwide.

This is problematic because, while technologies often seem magical or “off the ground”, this case reminds us once again that the materiality of the internet impacts us all, everywhere. The location of the services that one uses may expose them to the political agenda of a remote country. This case shows how the US can mobilise various digital organisations on its territory and combine intersectoral motives to weaken extraterritorial infrastructures.

The impact on fundamental rights for EU organisations and citizens

This case sets a precedent for foreign and geopolitical actions and threats by the US against digital infrastructures. The lack of involvement of judicial processes, while these decisions have major impacts on organisations and users worldwide, is a direct threat to citizens’ freedom of expression and freedom of information, and therefore undermines their ability to impart information and to exercise their freedom of opinion.

It increases the legal and operational risks for EU‑based digital and financial organisations, as it creates a chilling effect on all stakeholders. 

The impact on EU organisations, whether digital infrastructures or financial organisations, will be severe, as this case demonstrates how similar measures could be repeated across the world, affecting banks and other service providers in France, Germany, and other countries in Europe and worldwide.

It underlines the need to develop multistakeholder (various parties participating in decision‑making) and/or multilateral governance models for critical infrastructures. Is it realistic at this stage to foster the development of such an environment while facing such pressures? 

More information needed?